27 mars 2018 Serhii Apalkov (Oles Honchar Dnipro National University))
Financing entrepreneurship by crowdfunding : How to remunerate investors ?
co-écrit avec Sébastien Ménard.
In this article, we are interested in the optimal sequence of payments during crowdfunding fundraising.
In a context where investors do not have perfect information on the reliability of a project, the behavior of other investors is an information to be taken into account.
Then, It can appear informational cascades. In other words, each investor ignores his own information and mimics the behavior of other agents.
This is a mechanism that can limit the financing of entrepreneurship by crowdfunding. In this paper, we analyze several ways to remunerate investors.
We show that the appearance of informational cascades depends on the compensation contract offered to investors.
In particular, the possibility of proposing revisable rates of return makes it possible to avoid cascading, to aggregate more information and consequently to reduce the cost of financing.
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